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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
RONALD E. FITZGERALD 
CASE NO. 20130 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SUMMIT COUNTY, JUDGE DAVID B. DEE 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action asserts the invalidity of a holographic will. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On motion for summary judgment and memoranda the lower court, 
without notice or hearing, appointed respondent as personal repre-
sentative under the intestacy laws and, in denying appellant's 
petition for appointment, tacitly ruled that decedent's holographic 
wills were invalid. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondant seeks confirmation of the order of the lower court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent adopts the statement of facts in appellant's 
brief with this additional information. Ronald E0 Fitzgerald 
and Patricia Ann Christine Fernandez Cossey Fitzgerald were mar-
ried February 29, 1968. The parties separated and filed an 
action for divorce November 23, 1971, and a Decree of Divorce was 
filed September 13, 1972, Case No. 4237, in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The decedent, Ronald E. Fitzgerald, obtained two printed 
will forms and proceeded to fill in some of the blank spaces. 
The statute in effect at the time the execution of the 
purported wills took place invalidated such wills and they are 
null and void. 
The new probate code which was adopted after the execution 
of the wills by Ronald E0 Fitzgerald, would have permitted such 
wills to be probated. 
The principal issue to be decided in this matter is whether 
the new probate code made void, invalid wills legal and binding 
although they were not such at the time of their execution. 
The brief of the respondent cites Utah Cases and cases in 
other jurisdictions which involve the question prospective v. 
retroactive application of statutes pertaining to wills. 
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It is clear from the cases that the Uniform Probate Code 
should not have retroactive effect upon invalid wills. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE ALLEGED WILLS AT ISSUE HEREIN WERE 
VOID UNDER THE STATUTE IN EFFECT AT THE 
TIME OF THEIR EXECUTION. 
The alleged wills of the testator herein, as they are only 
partially in the handwriting of the testator, would not have 
been considered valid holographic wills under the law of Utah as 
the law existed prior to the enactment of the Uniform Probate Code. 
The statute in effect at the time the alleged wills were 
executed was Section 74-1-6 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
and is as follows: 
nAn olographic will is one that is entirely 
written, dated and signed by the hand of the testa-
tor himself. It is subject to no other form, and 
may be made in or out of this state and need not be 
witnessed. Such wills may be proved in the same 
manner as other private writings.ff 
The Utah Supreme Court followed this statute up until the 
time of the enactment of the Uniform Probate Code. See generally, 
In re Ray Wolcott Estate, 54 Utah 165 (1919); In re Love's Estate, 
75 Utah 342, 285 P. 299 (1930); In re Yowell's Estate, 75 Utah 312, 
285 P, 285 (1930); In re Alexander Estate, 104 Utah 286 (1943). 
The wills in question would not have been admitted to 
probate prior to the effective date of the new probate code. 
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POINT II 
THE VALIDITY OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS 
AT ISSUE HEREIN MUST BE GOVERNED BY THE 
LAW IN EFFECT IN UTAH AT THE DATE OF 
THE WILLS1 EXECUTION. 
A question has been raised as to the applicability of Sec-
tion 75-2-503 (1978 & Supp. 1983) Utah Code Annotated. That pro-
vision validated a holographic will wherein the "signature and 
material provisions are in the handwriting of the testator." Id. 
If this section governs the question of the validity of the will, 
the will could be admitted to probate. However, if this section 
is not applicable, and it is the contention of the plaintiff that 
it is not, then the will must not be admitted to probate9 There 
is ample support, based upon generally recognized principles of 
law in Utah and other jurisdictions, for the position that Section 
75-2-503 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, should not be held 
to govern the validity of the testator's wills and that, consequent" 
the wills in question must be denied probate. 
The courts of this state have consistently held that lf[o]rd: 
arily legislative enactments are intended to operate prospectively 
and not retroactively .ff See McCarrey v. Utah State Teachers1 Retire-
ment Board, 111 Utah 251, 177 P.2d 725, 726 (1947); In re Ingraham1 
Estate, 196 Utah 336, 143 P.2d 340, 341 (1944); see also State vQ 
Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977). This rule of prospective 
operation must be followed unless there is a clearly expressed legi 
lative intent to the contrary. McCarrey v0 Utah State Teachers1 
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Retirement Board, supra, 177 P02d at 726; In £e Ingrahamfs Estate, 
supra, 148 P.2d at 341. The court in McCarrey noted the strict-
ness of this rule when it stated: 
Ordinarily legislative enactments are 
intended to operate prospectively and 
not retrospectively. As said in 50 Am. 
Jur. 494, Statutes, Section 478: "The 
question whether a statute operated retro-
spectively, or prospectively only, is one of 
legislative intent0 In determining such 
intent, the courts have evolved a strict 
rule of construction against a retrospective 
operation, and indulge in the presumption 
that the legislature intended statutes, or 
amendmendments thereof, enacted by it to operate 
prospectively only, and not retroactively. 
Indeed, the general rule is that they are to 
be so construed, where they are susceptible of 
such interpretation and the intention of the 
legislature can be satisfied thereby, where 
such interpretation does not produce results 
which the legislature may be presumed not to 
have intended, and where the intention of the 
legislature to make the statute retroactive is 
not stated in express terms, or clearly, ex-
plicitly, positively, unequivocally, unmis-"~~ 
takably, and unambigously shown by necessary 
implication or terms which permit no other 
meaning to be annexed to them, preclude all 
question in regardTHereto, and leave "no reason-
able doubt thereof. Ordinarily, an intention to""" 
give a statute a retroactive operation will not"" 
be interred. It it is doubtful whether tTTe 
statute or amendment was intended to operate 
retrospectively, the doubt would be resolved 
against such operation. * * *Q" 
177 P02d at 726 (emphasis added). 
There is no indication of any legislative intent of retro-
active application found in Section 7r>-2-503 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. Neither is there any such showing of intent "in 
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express terms . . . .or terms which permit no other meaning to be 
annexed to them.11 See McCarrey v. Utah State Teachers1 Retirement 
Board, supra, 177 P.2d at 726, found in Section 75-8-101 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, which sets forth the effective date 
of the statute„ 
In Section 75-8-101(2)(a) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amendec 
it is provided merely that the code applies to wills of testators 
dying after the code's effective date0 Section 75-8-101(2)(b) re-
lates to pending actions as of the effective date of the code, a 
circumstance not found in the instant case* Neither of these pro-
visions mandates an interpretation that the code as a whole is to 
be applied retroactively to wills executed before its effective 
date. 
In Section 75-8-101(2)(e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, it is provided that n[a]ny rule of construction of pre-
sumption provided in this code applies to instruments executed 
. . . .before the effective date unless there is a clear indica-
tion of a contrary intent„" Although it cannot be stated that the 
will expresses an intention that a statute or rule of law other 
than the new probate code should apply, it also cannot be stated 
that Section 75-2-503, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, which 
recognized the validity of certain types of holographic wills pre-
viously declared void, is a "rule of construction of presumption 
provided in this code0" Section 75-8-101(2)(e) Utah Code Annotated. 
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The enactment of Section 75-2-503 Utah Code Annotated is a change 
in a substantive rule of law. Therefore, Section 75-8-101(2)(e) 
Utah Code Annotated cannot be understood as authorizing the appli-
cation of Section 72-2-503 Utah Code Annotated to wills executed 
before the code's effective date. 
Because there is nothing in the code which clearly and un-
equivocally expresses a legislative intent for the retroactive 
operation of the code's provisions, as is required by the 
standard adopted in McCarrey v. Utah State Teachers' Retirement 
Board, supra, 177 P.2d at 726 Section 75-2-503 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, must be given a solely prospective application. 
In addition, because Section 75-2-503 Utah Code Annotated, effects 
a substantive change in the law, the exception to the general rule 
of prospective operation of statutes where procedural or remedial 
enactments are involved does not apply. See, e.g., Pilcher v. 
State, Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450, 455-56 (Utah 
1983). 
Although no reported Utah decisions could be located which in-
volve the questions of prospective versus retroactive application 
of statutes pertaining to wills, nuraerous other jurisdictions have 
considered the question fo whether the law in effect at the date of 
the wills' execution, or the date of the testator's death, sould 
govern. A number of these courts have ruled that the law in effect 
when the will was executed must be applied. 
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For instance, in Barker v. Hinton, 62 W0 Va. 639, 59 S.E. 614 
(1907) the question was the validity of a will in light of an 
amendment of the statutory requirements governing attesting witnes-
ses o The court held that "the law existing at the date of the ex-
ecution of a will disposing of real estate, and not that at the 
date of the death of the testator, governs the formalities of the 
execution and attestation thereof," 59 S.E. at 617-18. 
In Mitchell v. Kimbrough, 98 Tenn0 535, 41 SUW. 993 (1807), 
a married woman's will was challenged on the basis that she lacked 
the capacity to execute a will0 The will was executed prior to the 
enactment of the statute allowing married women to convey property 
by testamentary devise. The court rejected the argument that the 
statute validated her previously executed will, holding that nthe 
legality of the execution of a will should be judged by the law 
as it was when it was executed, and not as it was at the death of 
the testator.11 41 S.W. at 994. 
The court's decision in Giddings v. Turgeon, 58 Vt. 106, 4 A. 
711 (1886) also followed the rule that the law at the date of a 
will's execution controls when the validity of the will is at issue. 
The court held a will invalid because the spouse of the testator 
who was a designated legatee was also a witness to the will. The 
court refused to determine the question of the will's validity in 
light of a later enacted statute which rendered only the bequest to 
the interest witness void,, 4 A. at 713-15. 
-8-
Other courts have rendered similar rulings regarding the issue 
of whether statutes as to wills should be given retroactive effects 
See e.ga, DeMars v. Slama, 91 Nev. 503, 540 P.2d 119, 120 (1975) 
(statute which affected right to contract away property previously 
disposed of by will was not applicable to contracts entered into 
before statute's effective date); Iri £e Berger's Estate, 198 Cal, 
103, 243 P. 862, 864-65 (1926) (statute which revoked will of a 
woman who later married was not retroactive); Packer v. Packer, 
179 Pa0 580, 36 A. 344, 345 (1897) (statute authorizing married 
women to execute wills was not retroactive to will enacted pre-
viously) ; Burkett v Whittemore, 36 S»C. 428, 15 S.E. 616, 617-19 
(1892) (statute authorizing married women to execute will was not 
retroactive); Appeal of Lane, 57 Conn. 182, 17 A. 926, 927-28, 
(1889) (statute as to attesting witnesses to a will was not retro-
active) ; and Goodsellfs Appeal, 55 Conn. 171, 10 Au 557, 558-59, 
(1887) (statute providing that wills are revoked where the testator 
subsequently marries or has a child does not apply retrospectively). 
C O N C L U S I O N 
In the present case, this court should follow the principles 
set forth in the decisions cited above and it should hold that 
Section 75-2-503 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, is not to 
be given a retroactive application. Instead, the law in effect at 
the date of the wills' execution must govern. That law mandates 
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that the wills be denied probate and the decision of the lower 
court be affirmed,, 
Respectfully submitted, 
tar old Call l 
/Attorney for Respondent 
6 
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